Loading django/utils/http.py +1 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ def is_safe_url(url, host=None): """ if not url: return False url = url.strip() # Chrome treats \ completely as / url = url.replace('\\', '/') # Chrome considers any URL with more than two slashes to be absolute, but Loading docs/releases/1.4.18.txt +14 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -31,6 +31,20 @@ development server now does the same. Django's development server is not recommended for production use, but matching the behavior of common production servers reduces the surface area for behavior changes during deployment. Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs ============================================================= Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g. :func:`django.contrib.auth.views.login` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`) to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these redirects (namely ``django.util.http.is_safe_url()``) didn't strip leading whitespace on the tested URL and as such considered URLs like ``\njavascript:...`` safe. If a developer relied on ``is_safe_url()`` to provide safe redirect targets and put such a URL into a link, they could suffer from a XSS attack. This bug doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put this URL into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore JavaScript there. Bugfixes ======== Loading docs/releases/1.6.10.txt +14 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -29,3 +29,17 @@ containing underscores from incoming requests by default. Django's built-in development server now does the same. Django's development server is not recommended for production use, but matching the behavior of common production servers reduces the surface area for behavior changes during deployment. Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs ============================================================= Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g. :func:`django.contrib.auth.views.login` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`) to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these redirects (namely ``django.util.http.is_safe_url()``) didn't strip leading whitespace on the tested URL and as such considered URLs like ``\njavascript:...`` safe. If a developer relied on ``is_safe_url()`` to provide safe redirect targets and put such a URL into a link, they could suffer from a XSS attack. This bug doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put this URL into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore JavaScript there. tests/utils_tests/test_http.py +2 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ class TestUtilsHttp(unittest.TestCase): 'http:/\//example.com', 'http:\/example.com', 'http:/\example.com', 'javascript:alert("XSS")'): 'javascript:alert("XSS")', '\njavascript:alert(x)'): self.assertFalse(http.is_safe_url(bad_url, host='testserver'), "%s should be blocked" % bad_url) for good_url in ('/view/?param=http://example.com', '/view/?param=https://example.com', Loading Loading
django/utils/http.py +1 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ def is_safe_url(url, host=None): """ if not url: return False url = url.strip() # Chrome treats \ completely as / url = url.replace('\\', '/') # Chrome considers any URL with more than two slashes to be absolute, but Loading
docs/releases/1.4.18.txt +14 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -31,6 +31,20 @@ development server now does the same. Django's development server is not recommended for production use, but matching the behavior of common production servers reduces the surface area for behavior changes during deployment. Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs ============================================================= Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g. :func:`django.contrib.auth.views.login` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`) to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these redirects (namely ``django.util.http.is_safe_url()``) didn't strip leading whitespace on the tested URL and as such considered URLs like ``\njavascript:...`` safe. If a developer relied on ``is_safe_url()`` to provide safe redirect targets and put such a URL into a link, they could suffer from a XSS attack. This bug doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put this URL into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore JavaScript there. Bugfixes ======== Loading
docs/releases/1.6.10.txt +14 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -29,3 +29,17 @@ containing underscores from incoming requests by default. Django's built-in development server now does the same. Django's development server is not recommended for production use, but matching the behavior of common production servers reduces the surface area for behavior changes during deployment. Mitigated possible XSS attack via user-supplied redirect URLs ============================================================= Django relies on user input in some cases (e.g. :func:`django.contrib.auth.views.login` and :doc:`i18n </topics/i18n/index>`) to redirect the user to an "on success" URL. The security checks for these redirects (namely ``django.util.http.is_safe_url()``) didn't strip leading whitespace on the tested URL and as such considered URLs like ``\njavascript:...`` safe. If a developer relied on ``is_safe_url()`` to provide safe redirect targets and put such a URL into a link, they could suffer from a XSS attack. This bug doesn't affect Django currently, since we only put this URL into the ``Location`` response header and browsers seem to ignore JavaScript there.
tests/utils_tests/test_http.py +2 −1 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -109,7 +109,8 @@ class TestUtilsHttp(unittest.TestCase): 'http:/\//example.com', 'http:\/example.com', 'http:/\example.com', 'javascript:alert("XSS")'): 'javascript:alert("XSS")', '\njavascript:alert(x)'): self.assertFalse(http.is_safe_url(bad_url, host='testserver'), "%s should be blocked" % bad_url) for good_url in ('/view/?param=http://example.com', '/view/?param=https://example.com', Loading