Commit 509b00d3 authored by Axel Lin's avatar Axel Lin Committed by Peter Korsgaard
Browse files

lighttpd: apply security patches for lighttpd-1.4.33

Apply security patches for lighttpd-1.4.33.
Also rename these patches to follow buildroot's naming scheme.

lighttpd-03-fix_fam_use_after_free.patch:
http://download.lighttpd.net/lighttpd/security/lighttpd-1.4.33_fix_fam_use_after_free.patch

lighttpd-04-fix_setuid.patch:
http://download.lighttpd.net/lighttpd/security/lighttpd-1.4.33_fix_setuid.patch

lighttpd-05-fix_ssl_sni.patch:
http://download.lighttpd.net/lighttpd/security/lighttpd-1.4.33_fix_ssl_sni.patch



Signed-off-by: default avatarAxel Lin <axel.lin@ingics.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPeter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
parent 9a61d1f7
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+22 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
commit ae1335503a8f63489f847668ee37df8470a2ab0a
Author: Stefan Bühler <stbuehler@web.de>
Date:   Wed Nov 13 11:43:28 2013 +0000

    [stat-cache] FAM: fix use after free (CVE-2013-4560)
    
    From: Stefan Bühler <stbuehler@web.de>
    
    git-svn-id: svn://svn.lighttpd.net/lighttpd/branches/lighttpd-1.4.x@2921 152afb58-edef-0310-8abb-c4023f1b3aa9

diff --git a/src/stat_cache.c b/src/stat_cache.c
index e995f3b..924f4dc 100644
--- a/src/stat_cache.c
+++ b/src/stat_cache.c
@@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ handler_t stat_cache_get_entry(server *srv, connection *con, buffer *name, stat_
 						FamErrlist[FAMErrno]);
 
 				fam_dir_entry_free(fam_dir);
+				fam_dir = NULL;
 			} else {
 				int osize = 0;
 
+43 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
commit 99cddff73ab4023186bcfca54cbb73051140e15d
Author: Stefan Bühler <stbuehler@web.de>
Date:   Wed Nov 13 11:43:33 2013 +0000

    [core] check success of setuid,setgid,setgroups (CVE-2013-4559)
    
    From: Stefan Bühler <stbuehler@web.de>
    
    git-svn-id: svn://svn.lighttpd.net/lighttpd/branches/lighttpd-1.4.x@2923 152afb58-edef-0310-8abb-c4023f1b3aa9

diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
index 2d825bb..e2b42eb 100644
--- a/src/server.c
+++ b/src/server.c
@@ -820,8 +820,14 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) {
 		 * to /etc/group
 		 * */
 		if (NULL != grp) {
-			setgid(grp->gr_gid);
-			setgroups(0, NULL);
+			if (-1 == setgid(grp->gr_gid)) {
+				log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "setgid failed: ", strerror(errno));
+				return -1;
+			}
+			if (-1 == setgroups(0, NULL)) {
+				log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "setgroups failed: ", strerror(errno));
+				return -1;
+			}
 			if (srv->srvconf.username->used) {
 				initgroups(srv->srvconf.username->ptr, grp->gr_gid);
 			}
@@ -844,7 +850,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv) {
 #ifdef HAVE_PWD_H
 		/* drop root privs */
 		if (NULL != pwd) {
-			setuid(pwd->pw_uid);
+			if (-1 == setuid(pwd->pw_uid)) {
+				log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "setuid failed: ", strerror(errno));
+				return -1;
+			}
 		}
 #endif
 #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
+369 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
commit 1af871fcef97574c71870309d572d6b1026ee605
Author: Stefan Bühler <stbuehler@web.de>
Date:   Tue Nov 5 15:29:07 2013 +0000

    [ssl] fix SNI handling; only use key+cert+verify-client from SNI specific config (fixes #2525, CVE-2013-4508)
    
    pull all ssl.ca-file values into all SSL_CTXs, but use only the local
    ssl.ca-file for verify-client; correct SNI name is no requirement,
    so enforcing verification for a subset of SNI names doesn't actually
    protect those.
    
    From: Stefan Bühler <stbuehler@web.de>
    
    git-svn-id: svn://svn.lighttpd.net/lighttpd/branches/lighttpd-1.4.x@2913 152afb58-edef-0310-8abb-c4023f1b3aa9

diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
diff --git a/src/base.h b/src/base.h
index 5d79a33..6a8df14 100644
--- a/src/base.h
+++ b/src/base.h
@@ -320,7 +320,11 @@ typedef struct {
 	off_t *global_bytes_per_second_cnt_ptr; /*  */
 
 #ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-	SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx;
+	SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx; /* not patched */
+	/* SNI per host: with COMP_SERVER_SOCKET, COMP_HTTP_SCHEME, COMP_HTTP_HOST */
+	EVP_PKEY *ssl_pemfile_pkey;
+	X509 *ssl_pemfile_x509;
+	STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ssl_ca_file_cert_names;
 #endif
 } specific_config;
 
diff --git a/src/configfile.c b/src/configfile.c
index 7408ed0..18b36b3 100644
--- a/src/configfile.c
+++ b/src/configfile.c
@@ -339,9 +339,13 @@ int config_setup_connection(server *srv, connection *con) {
 
 	PATCH(ssl_pemfile);
 #ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-	PATCH(ssl_ctx);
+	PATCH(ssl_pemfile_x509);
+	PATCH(ssl_pemfile_pkey);
 #endif
 	PATCH(ssl_ca_file);
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+	PATCH(ssl_ca_file_cert_names);
+#endif
 	PATCH(ssl_cipher_list);
 	PATCH(ssl_dh_file);
 	PATCH(ssl_ec_curve);
@@ -409,10 +413,14 @@ int config_patch_connection(server *srv, connection *con, comp_key_t comp) {
 			} else if (buffer_is_equal_string(du->key, CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.pemfile"))) {
 				PATCH(ssl_pemfile);
 #ifdef USE_OPENSSL
-				PATCH(ssl_ctx);
+				PATCH(ssl_pemfile_x509);
+				PATCH(ssl_pemfile_pkey);
 #endif
 			} else if (buffer_is_equal_string(du->key, CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.ca-file"))) {
 				PATCH(ssl_ca_file);
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+				PATCH(ssl_ca_file_cert_names);
+#endif
 			} else if (buffer_is_equal_string(du->key, CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.honor-cipher-order"))) {
 				PATCH(ssl_honor_cipher_order);
 			} else if (buffer_is_equal_string(du->key, CONST_STR_LEN("ssl.use-sslv2"))) {
diff --git a/src/network.c b/src/network.c
index cb0564f..f6d890b 100644
--- a/src/network.c
+++ b/src/network.c
@@ -112,20 +112,46 @@ static int network_ssl_servername_callback(SSL *ssl, int *al, server *srv) {
 	config_patch_connection(srv, con, COMP_HTTP_SCHEME);
 	config_patch_connection(srv, con, COMP_HTTP_HOST);
 
-	if (NULL == con->conf.ssl_ctx) {
-		/* ssl_ctx <=> pemfile was set <=> ssl_ctx got patched: so this should never happen */
+	if (NULL == con->conf.ssl_pemfile_x509 || NULL == con->conf.ssl_pemfile_pkey) {
+		/* x509/pkey available <=> pemfile was set <=> pemfile got patched: so this should never happen, unless you nest $SERVER["socket"] */
 		log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:",
-			"null SSL_CTX for TLS server name", con->tlsext_server_name);
+			"no certificate/private key for TLS server name", con->tlsext_server_name);
 		return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
 	}
 
-	/* switch to new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension */
-	if (con->conf.ssl_ctx != SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, con->conf.ssl_ctx)) {
-		log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:",
-			"failed to set SSL_CTX for TLS server name", con->tlsext_server_name);
+	/* first set certificate! setting private key checks whether certificate matches it */
+	if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, con->conf.ssl_pemfile_x509)) {
+		log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb:s", "SSL:",
+			"failed to set certificate for TLS server name", con->tlsext_server_name,
+			ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+		return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+	}
+
+	if (!SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, con->conf.ssl_pemfile_pkey)) {
+		log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb:s", "SSL:",
+			"failed to set private key for TLS server name", con->tlsext_server_name,
+			ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
 		return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
 	}
 
+	if (con->conf.ssl_verifyclient) {
+		if (NULL == con->conf.ssl_ca_file_cert_names) {
+			log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb:s", "SSL:",
+				"can't verify client without ssl.ca-file for TLS server name", con->tlsext_server_name,
+				ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+			return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+		}
+
+		SSL_set_client_CA_list(ssl, SSL_dup_CA_list(con->conf.ssl_ca_file_cert_names));
+		/* forcing verification here is really not that useful - a client could just connect without SNI */
+		SSL_set_verify(
+			ssl,
+			SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (con->conf.ssl_verifyclient_enforce ? SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT : 0),
+			NULL
+		);
+		SSL_set_verify_depth(ssl, con->conf.ssl_verifyclient_depth);
+	}
+
 	return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
 }
 #endif
@@ -491,9 +517,100 @@ typedef enum {
 	NETWORK_BACKEND_SOLARIS_SENDFILEV
 } network_backend_t;
 
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+static X509* x509_load_pem_file(server *srv, const char *file) {
+	BIO *in;
+	X509 *x = NULL;
+
+	in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+	if (NULL == in) {
+		log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "S", "SSL: BIO_new(BIO_s_file()) failed");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0) {
+		log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSS", "SSL: BIO_read_filename('", file,"') failed");
+		goto error;
+	}
+	x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+	if (NULL == x) {
+		log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSS", "SSL: couldn't read X509 certificate from '", file,"'");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	BIO_free(in);
+	return x;
+
+error:
+	if (NULL != x) X509_free(x);
+	if (NULL != in) BIO_free(in);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY* evp_pkey_load_pem_file(server *srv, const char *file) {
+	BIO *in;
+	EVP_PKEY *x = NULL;
+
+	in=BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+	if (NULL == in) {
+		log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "s", "SSL: BIO_new(BIO_s_file()) failed");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	if (BIO_read_filename(in,file) <= 0) {
+		log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSS", "SSL: BIO_read_filename('", file,"') failed");
+		goto error;
+	}
+	x = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+	if (NULL == x) {
+		log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "SSS", "SSL: couldn't read private key from '", file,"'");
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	BIO_free(in);
+	return x;
+
+error:
+	if (NULL != x) EVP_PKEY_free(x);
+	if (NULL != in) BIO_free(in);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int network_openssl_load_pemfile(server *srv, size_t ndx) {
+	specific_config *s = srv->config_storage[ndx];
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+	{
+		data_config *dc = (data_config *)srv->config_context->data[i];
+		if ((ndx > 0 && (COMP_SERVER_SOCKET != dc->comp || dc->cond != CONFIG_COND_EQ))
+			|| !s->ssl_enabled) {
+			log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "SSL:",
+					"ssl.pemfile only works in SSL socket binding context as openssl version does not support TLS extensions");
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (NULL == (s->ssl_pemfile_x509 = x509_load_pem_file(srv, s->ssl_pemfile->ptr))) return -1;
+	if (NULL == (s->ssl_pemfile_pkey = evp_pkey_load_pem_file(srv, s->ssl_pemfile->ptr))) return -1;
+
+	if (!X509_check_private_key(s->ssl_pemfile_x509, s->ssl_pemfile_pkey)) {
+		log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "sssb", "SSL:",
+				"Private key does not match the certificate public key, reason:",
+				ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL),
+				s->ssl_pemfile);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
 int network_init(server *srv) {
 	buffer *b;
-	size_t i;
+	size_t i, j;
 	network_backend_t backend;
 
 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL
@@ -580,18 +697,7 @@ int network_init(server *srv) {
 		long ssloptions =
 			SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION | SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
 
-		if (buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_pemfile)) continue;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-		{
-			data_config *dc = (data_config *)srv->config_context->data[i];
-			if (COMP_HTTP_HOST == dc->comp) {
-			    log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "SSL:",
-					    "can't use ssl.pemfile with $HTTP[\"host\"], openssl version does not support TLS extensions");
-			    return -1;
-			}
-		}
-#endif
+		if (buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_pemfile) && buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_ca_file)) continue;
 
 		if (srv->ssl_is_init == 0) {
 			SSL_load_error_strings();
@@ -606,6 +712,29 @@ int network_init(server *srv) {
 			}
 		}
 
+		if (!buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_pemfile)) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+			data_config *dc = (data_config *)srv->config_context->data[i];
+			if (COMP_HTTP_HOST == dc->comp) {
+				log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "SSL:",
+						"can't use ssl.pemfile with $HTTP[\"host\"], openssl version does not support TLS extensions");
+				return -1;
+			}
+#endif
+			if (network_openssl_load_pemfile(srv, i)) return -1;
+		}
+
+
+		if (!buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_ca_file)) {
+			s->ssl_ca_file_cert_names = SSL_load_client_CA_file(s->ssl_ca_file->ptr);
+			if (NULL == s->ssl_ca_file_cert_names) {
+				log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:",
+						ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s->ssl_ca_file);
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_pemfile) || !s->ssl_enabled) continue;
+
 		if (NULL == (s->ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method()))) {
 			log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "SSL:",
 					ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
@@ -721,45 +850,42 @@ int network_init(server *srv) {
 #endif
 #endif
 
-		if (!buffer_is_empty(s->ssl_ca_file)) {
-			if (1 != SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_ca_file->ptr, NULL)) {
-				log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:",
-						ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s->ssl_ca_file);
-				return -1;
-			}
-			if (s->ssl_verifyclient) {
-				STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *certs = SSL_load_client_CA_file(s->ssl_ca_file->ptr);
-				if (!certs) {
+		/* load all ssl.ca-files specified in the config into each SSL_CTX to be prepared for SNI */
+		for (j = 0; j < srv->config_context->used; j++) {
+			specific_config *s1 = srv->config_storage[j];
+
+			if (!buffer_is_empty(s1->ssl_ca_file)) {
+				if (1 != SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(s->ssl_ctx, s1->ssl_ca_file->ptr, NULL)) {
 					log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:",
-							ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s->ssl_ca_file);
-				}
-				if (SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(s->ssl_ctx, (void*) &srv, sizeof(srv)) != 1) {
-					log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ss", "SSL:",
-						ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+							ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s1->ssl_ca_file);
 					return -1;
 				}
-				SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(s->ssl_ctx, certs);
-				SSL_CTX_set_verify(
-					s->ssl_ctx,
-					SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (s->ssl_verifyclient_enforce ? SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT : 0),
-					NULL
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (s->ssl_verifyclient) {
+			if (NULL == s->ssl_ca_file_cert_names) {
+				log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "s",
+					"SSL: You specified ssl.verifyclient.activate but no ca_file"
 				);
-				SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_verifyclient_depth);
+				return -1;
 			}
-		} else if (s->ssl_verifyclient) {
-			log_error_write(
-				srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "s",
-				"SSL: You specified ssl.verifyclient.activate but no ca_file"
+			SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(s->ssl_ctx, SSL_dup_CA_list(s->ssl_ca_file_cert_names));
+			SSL_CTX_set_verify(
+				s->ssl_ctx,
+				SSL_VERIFY_PEER | (s->ssl_verifyclient_enforce ? SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT : 0),
+				NULL
 			);
+			SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_verifyclient_depth);
 		}
 
-		if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_pemfile->ptr, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) < 0) {
+		if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_pemfile_x509) < 0) {
 			log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:",
 					ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s->ssl_pemfile);
 			return -1;
 		}
 
-		if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file (s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_pemfile->ptr, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) < 0) {
+		if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(s->ssl_ctx, s->ssl_pemfile_pkey) < 0) {
 			log_error_write(srv, __FILE__, __LINE__, "ssb", "SSL:",
 					ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL), s->ssl_pemfile);
 			return -1;
@@ -856,7 +982,6 @@ int network_init(server *srv) {
 	for (i = 1; i < srv->config_context->used; i++) {
 		data_config *dc = (data_config *)srv->config_context->data[i];
 		specific_config *s = srv->config_storage[i];
-		size_t j;
 
 		/* not our stage */
 		if (COMP_SERVER_SOCKET != dc->comp) continue;
diff --git a/src/server.c b/src/server.c
index a779928..1eb68b6 100644
--- a/src/server.c
+++ b/src/server.c
@@ -314,6 +314,9 @@ static void server_free(server *srv) {
 			buffer_free(s->ssl_verifyclient_username);
 #ifdef USE_OPENSSL
 			SSL_CTX_free(s->ssl_ctx);
+			EVP_PKEY_free(s->ssl_pemfile_pkey);
+			X509_free(s->ssl_pemfile_x509);
+			if (NULL != s->ssl_ca_file_cert_names) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->ssl_ca_file_cert_names, X509_NAME_free);
 #endif
 			free(s);
 		}