Commit 39d1717e authored by Baruch Siach's avatar Baruch Siach Committed by Peter Korsgaard
Browse files

wpa_supplicant: fix internal TLS implementation security issues 

Add upstream patches fixing internal TLS validation of X.509 certificates. See
http://lists.shmoo.com/pipermail/hostap/2014-May/030273.html

 for details.

Signed-off-by: default avatarBaruch Siach <baruch@tkos.co.il>
Signed-off-by: default avatarPeter Korsgaard <peter@korsgaard.com>
parent 9725c5ae

package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0002-X.509-Fix-internal-TLS-X.509-validation-of-PKCS-1-si.patch

0 → 100644
+38 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
From 9c29d48725fd40a82407a89f193cf009aeef9745 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>

Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 23:25:38 +0300

Subject: [PATCH] X.509: Fix internal TLS/X.509 validation of PKCS#1

 signature



Verify that there is no extra data after the hash field. This is needed

to avoid potential attacks using additional data to construct a value

that passes the RSA operation and allows the hash value to be forged.



Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>

---

 src/tls/x509v3.c | 9 +++++++++

 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)



diff --git a/src/tls/x509v3.c b/src/tls/x509v3.c

index a9483cb7fc2f..751a268e1caf 100644

--- a/src/tls/x509v3.c

+++ b/src/tls/x509v3.c

@@ -1783,6 +1783,15 @@ skip_digest_oid:

 		return -1;

 	}

 

+	if (hdr.payload + hdr.length < data + data_len) {

+		wpa_hexdump(MSG_INFO,

+			    "X509: Extra data after certificate signature hash",

+			    hdr.payload + hdr.length,

+			    data + data_len - hdr.payload - hdr.length);

+		os_free(data);

+		return -1;

+	}

+

 	os_free(data);

 

 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "X509: Certificate Digest matches with "

-- 

2.0.0.rc2

package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0003-PKCS-1-Allow-only-BT-01-for-signature-in-internal-TL.patch

0 → 100644
+67 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
From e6d83cc7babb978ba53ae8686159b41ab0f448cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>

Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 23:26:19 +0300

Subject: [PATCH] PKCS #1: Allow only BT=01 for signature in internal TLS



Based on PKCS #1, v1.5, 10.1.3, the block type shall be 01 for a

signature. This avoids a potential attack vector for internal TLS/X.509

implementation.



Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>

---

 src/tls/pkcs1.c | 29 ++++++++++-------------------

 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)



diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c

index b6fde5ee868a..af58a42987c6 100644

--- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c

+++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c

@@ -142,35 +142,26 @@ int pkcs1_decrypt_public_key(struct crypto_rsa_key *key,

 	 * BT = 00 or 01

 	 * PS = k-3-||D|| times (00 if BT=00) or (FF if BT=01)

 	 * k = length of modulus in octets

+	 *

+	 * Based on 10.1.3, "The block type shall be 01" for a signature.

 	 */

 

 	if (len < 3 + 8 + 16 /* min hash len */ ||

-	    plain[0] != 0x00 || (plain[1] != 0x00 && plain[1] != 0x01)) {

+	    plain[0] != 0x00 || plain[1] != 0x01) {

 		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature EB "

 			   "structure");

 		return -1;

 	}

 

 	pos = plain + 3;

-	if (plain[1] == 0x00) {

-		/* BT = 00 */

-		if (plain[2] != 0x00) {

-			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature "

-				   "PS (BT=00)");

-			return -1;

-		}

-		while (pos + 1 < plain + len && *pos == 0x00 && pos[1] == 0x00)

-			pos++;

-	} else {

-		/* BT = 01 */

-		if (plain[2] != 0xff) {

-			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature "

-				   "PS (BT=01)");

-			return -1;

-		}

-		while (pos < plain + len && *pos == 0xff)

-			pos++;

+	/* BT = 01 */

+	if (plain[2] != 0xff) {

+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Invalid signature "

+			   "PS (BT=01)");

+		return -1;

 	}

+	while (pos < plain + len && *pos == 0xff)

+		pos++;

 

 	if (pos - plain - 2 < 8) {

 		/* PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1: At least eight octets long PS */

-- 

2.0.0.rc2

package/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant-0004-PKCS-1-Enforce-minimum-padding-for-decryption-in-int.patch

0 → 100644
+35 −0
Original line number Diff line number Diff line 
From 6c5be116dd6997f68e524247751cff53c74519d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>

Date: Mon, 19 May 2014 23:26:43 +0300

Subject: [PATCH] PKCS #1: Enforce minimum padding for decryption in

 internal TLS



Follow the PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1 constraint of at least eight octets long PS

for the case where the internal TLS implementation decrypts PKCS #1

formatted data. Similar limit was already in place for signature

validation, but not for this decryption routine.



Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>

---

 src/tls/pkcs1.c | 5 +++++

 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)



diff --git a/src/tls/pkcs1.c b/src/tls/pkcs1.c

index af58a42987c6..ea3e6171a1d1 100644

--- a/src/tls/pkcs1.c

+++ b/src/tls/pkcs1.c

@@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ int pkcs1_v15_private_key_decrypt(struct crypto_rsa_key *key,

 		pos++;

 	if (pos == end)

 		return -1;

+	if (pos - out - 2 < 8) {

+		/* PKCS #1 v1.5, 8.1: At least eight octets long PS */

+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "LibTomCrypt: Too short padding");

+		return -1;

+	}

 	pos++;

 

 	*outlen -= pos - out;

-- 

2.0.0.rc2